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TWO CONCEPTIONS OF  
IRREVERSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL HARM 
 
Cass R. Sunstein
* 
 
Abstract 
 
The concept of “irreversibility” plays a large role in the theory and practice of 
environmental protection. Indeed, the concept is explicit in some statements of the Precautionary 
Principle. But the idea of irreversibility remains poorly defined. Because time is linear, any loss 
is, in a sense, irreversible. On one approach, drawn from environmental economics, 
irreversibility might be understood as a reference to the value associated with taking 
precautionary steps that maintain flexibility for an uncertain future (“option value”). On another 
approach, drawn from environmental ethics, irreversibility might be understood to refer to the 
qualitatively distinctive nature of certain environmental harms—a point that raises a claim about 
incommensurability. The two conceptions fit different problems. For example, the idea of option 
value best fits the problem of climate change; the idea of qualitatively distinctive harms best fits 
the problem of extinction of endangered species. These ideas can be applied to a wide assortment 
of environmental problems. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Many environmental problems have an element of irreversibility. If a species is 
lost, it is probably lost forever; the same might well be true of pristine areas. Genetically 
modified organisms might lead to irreversible ecological harm; transgenic crops can 
impose irreversible losses by increasing pest resistance.
1 In recent decades, the problem 
of climate change has raised the most serious concerns about irreversibility. Some 
greenhouse gases stay in the atmosphere for centuries, and for that reason climate change 
threatens to be irreversible, at least for all practical purposes.
2  
The risk of irreversibility is especially troublesome in light of massive uncertainty 
                                                 
*Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of Political Science, 
University of Chicago. This essay builds on and elaborates preliminary treatments in Cass R. Sunstein, 
Laws of Fear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and 
Catastrophic, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 841 (2006). 
1See generally Benoit Morel et al., Pesticide Resistance, the Precautionary Principle, and the Regulation of 
Bt Corn: Real Option and Rational Option Approaches to Decisionmaking, in Battling Resistance to 
Antibiotics and Pesticides 184 (Ramanan Laxminarayan ed.) (Washington D.C.: Resources for the Future, 
2003) (proposing option theory as an analytical framework for the Precautionary Principle and applying 
that framework to the issue of commercializing Bt corn); Justus Wesseler, Resistance Economics of 
Transgenic Crops under Uncertainty: A Real Options Approach, in id. at 214 (discussing pest resistance as 
an irreversible cost of transgenic crops). 
2See W. David Montgomery and Anne E. Smith, Global Climate Change and the Precautionary Principle, 6 
Hum. & Ecological Risk Assessment 399, 400 (2000). 2 
about the actual damage from climate change. Suppose that we project, with the 
International Panel on Climate Change, warming between 1.8 and 4.0 C by 2100.
3 There 
is a large difference between adverse effects at 1.8 C and adverse effects at 4.0 C.
4 Even 
at a specified increase in temperature, it is exceedingly difficult to know the extent of the 
harm.
5 If the average global temperature increases by 3.0 C one hundred years from now, 
the extent of the greatly damage is disputed, in part because of uncertainty about the 
possibility of adaptation, in part because of uncertainty about the resulting effects on 
global conditions.
6 There is some risk of catastrophe, and once that risk is incorporated 
into the analysis, the assessment of what to do changes dramatically.
7 Aggressive 
measures, in the form of emissions reductions or adaptation, might be justified in order to 
maintain flexibility in the event that either warming or actual damage turns out to be at 
the higher end of the range.  
Concerned about the problem of irreversibility, sensible nations might consider 
adopting a distinctive (if admittedly vague) principle for handling certain kinds of risk: 
the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle.
8 Indeed, some such principle seems to 
underlie prominent accounts of the Precautionary Principle,
9 which point explicitly to the 
problem of irreversibility.
10 For example, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change proclaims: “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, 
lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing [regulatory] 
measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change 
should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.”
11 
Similarly, the 1992 Rio Declaration states, “Where there are threats of serious or 
                                                 
3See William Nordhaus, A Question of Balance (2008). 
4 See id.; Sudden and Disruptive Climate Change (Michael C. MacCracken et al. eds., 2007). 
5 For a variety of accounts, see id.; for a helpful overview, see Daniel Farber, Climate Models: A Users’ 
Guide (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1030607 
6For one discussion, see id.; Nordhaus, supra note.  
7 See Martin Weitzman, Structural Uncertainty and the Value of Statistical Life in the Economics of 
Catastrophic Climate Change (2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1021968 
8See Scott Farrow, Using Risk-Assessment, Benefit-Cost Analysis, and Real Options to Implement a 
Precautionary Principle, 24 Risk Analysis 727, 728 (2004). 
9On that principle, see Indur Goklany, The Precautionary Principle: A Critical Appraisal of Environmental 
Risk Assessment 6 (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 2001). 
10For general discussion, see Sunstein, supra note. 
11See Indur Goklany, The Precautionary Principle: A Critical Appraisal of Environmental Risk Assessment 
6 (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 2001). 3 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”
12  
In American environmental law, related ideas are at work. San Francisco has 
adopted its own precautionary principle, with an emphasis on irreversibility: “Where 
threats of serious or irreversible damage to people or nature exist, lack of full scientific 
certainty about cause and effect shall not be viewed as sufficient reason for the City to 
postpone cost effective measures to prevent the degradation of the environment or protect 
the health of its citizens.”
13 At the federal level, the National Environmental Policy Act 
requires agencies to discuss “any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources 
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.”
14 Courts 
have been careful to insist that environmental impact statements should be prepared at a 
time that permits consideration of environmental effects before irretrievable 
commitments have been made.
15 A number of other federal statutes, especially in the 
environmental context, specifically refer to irreversible losses and make their prevention 
a high priority.
16 Within the federal courts, a special precautionary principle underlies the 
analysis of preliminary injunctions in cases involving a risk of irreparable environmental 
harm.
17 
For those who emphasize irreversibility, the general attitude in the face of 
uncertainty is “act, then learn,” as opposed to the tempting and often sensible alternative 
of “wait and learn.” For climate change, some people have believed that research should 
be our first line of defense. In this view, nations should refuse to commit substantial 
resources to reducing greenhouse gas emissions or to adaptation until evidence of serious 
harm is clearer than it now us.
18 To be sure, this view seems to have fewer adherents 
                                                 
12Quoted in Bjorn Lomborg, The Skeptical Environmentalist 347 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2001). 
13See San Francisco Precautionary Principle Ordinance, available at 
http://temp.sfgov.org/sfenvironment/aboutus/innovative/pp/sfpp.htm 
1442 USC 102 (c)(5). 
15 See Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F3d 1135 (9
th Cir 2000); Scientists Inst. For Public Info v. AEC, 481 F2d 1079 
(DC Cir 1973); Sierra Club v. Marsh, 976 F2d 763 (1
st Cir 1985). 
16See, eg, 33 USC 2712(j) (making special exception to planning requirement for use of federal resources in 
a situation requiring action to avoid irreversible loss of natural resources”); 42 USC 9611 (i) (same 
exception for Superfund cleanups); 22 USC 2151p-1 (c)(2)(A) (requiring President to assist developing 
countries in a way that responds to “the irreversible losses associated with forest destruction”). 
17 See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F2 497 (1
st Cir. 1989); on the complexities here, see below. 
18See, e.g., Robert Mendelsohn, Perspective Paper 1.1, in Global Crises, Global Solutions 44, 47 (Bjørn 4 
every year.
19 But many reasonable people believe that our initial steps should be 
relatively cautious, increasing in aggressiveness as knowledge accumulates (and the costs 
of emissions reductions fall).
20 In this domain, however, there is a problem with any 
approach of “wait and learn.” If precautionary steps are not taken immediately, the results 
may be irreversible, or at best difficult and expensive to reverse. For climate change, it 
might be best to take precautions now as a way of preserving flexibility for future 
generations.
21  
My goal in this Essay is to explore the idea of irreversibility in environmental 
protection. In one sense, the idea is unhelpful: All losses are irreversible, simply because 
time is linear. If Jones plays tennis this afternoon, rather than working, the relevant time 
is lost forever. If a project to drill oil in Alaska is delayed for five years, there is an 
irreversible loss as well: The oil that might have been made available will not be made 
available when it otherwise would have been. When environmentalists emphasize the 
importance of irreversibility, I suggest that they are best taken as having two separate 
conceptions in mind. The first, drawn from environmental economics, is connected with 
the idea of option value, and in particular with the suggestion that when information is 
missing, it is worthwhile to spend resources to maintain future flexibility as knowledge 
increases. The second conception, drawn from environmental ethics, involves losses of 
goods that are incommensurable, not in the sense that they are infinitely valuable, but in 
the sense that they are qualitatively distinctive. The two conceptions of irreversibility 
point in different directions. The first points to a kind of “irreversibility premium,” 
embodied in a willingness to spend more on precautions or preparation. The second does 
                                                                                                                                                 
Lomborg ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Wilfred Beckerman, Small is Stupid 102–
103 (London: Duckworth, 1995). The cautious approach of the Bush Administration can be understood in 
this light. See Global Climate Change Policy Book (Feb. 2002), available at  
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/climatechange.html; Chuck Hagel and Frank Murkowski, 
High Costs of Kyoto, Wash. Post, Jan. 29, 2000, at A17. A number of years ago, Nordhaus and Boyer 
found that extremely little is lost by a ten-year delay in emissions reductions. See William D. Nordhaus and 
Joseph Boyer, Warming the World: Economic Models of Global Warming 127 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 2000) (describing the net loss as “trivially small”). For a technical discussion, see Alistair Ulph and 
David Ulph, Global Warming, Irreversibility and Learning, 107 Econ. J. 636 (1997). 
19See Nordhaus, supra note; Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change (2007). 
20See Nordhaus, supra note; William Nordhaus, A Review of the Stern Review of the Economics of 
Climate Change (2007), available at http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/recent_stuff.html 
21See Graciela Chichilnisky and Geoffrey Heal, Global Environmental Risks, 7 J. Econ. Persp. 65, 80 
(1993). 5 
not suggest any particular approach, but instead insists on a certain way of thinking about 
certain environmental problems. 
I shall focus throughout on the problem of climate change, because that problem 
has such evident importance and because it provides a good area for exploring the 
underlying puzzles. But as we shall see, the exploration of those puzzles bears on a wide 
range of questions about appropriate precautions, not only in the environmental arena, but 
in other legal domains and in daily life as well.  
 
II.  Uses, Options, and Irreversibility 
 
A.  Existence Value, Option Value 
 
Let us begin with the monetary valuation of an environmental good, such as a 
pristine area. Some people will be willing to pay to use the area; they may visit it on a 
regular basis, and they might be very upset at its loss. But others will be willing to pay to 
preserve it, even if they will not use it. In fact many citizens would be happy to give some 
money to save a pristine area, perhaps especially if animals can be found there. Hence 
“existence value” is sometimes included in the valuation of environmental goods,
22 and 
indeed federal courts have insisted that agencies pay attention to that value in assessing 
damages to natural resources.
23 Taken a group, citizens of many nations would be willing 
to pay a great deal to preserve an endangered species or to maintain the existence of a 
remote island and its ecosystem. In fact valuation of the damage from climate change 
must pay attention to the loss of species and animals, if only because human beings care 
about them.
24 
But some people are also willing to pay for the option to use or to benefit from an 
environmental amenity in the future, even if they are unsure whether they will exercise 
that option at any time.
25 Suppose that a pristine area might be developed in a way that 
                                                 
22See David A. Dana, Existence Value and Federal Preservation Regulation, 28 Harv Envtl. L. Rev. 343, 
345 (2004); Charles J. Cicchetti and Louis J. Wilde, Uniqueness, Irreversibility, and the Theory of Nonuse 
Values, Amer. J. Agric. Econ 1111. 1121, 1121–22 (1992). 
23See Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
24See Wayne Hsiung and Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change and Animals, 155 U Pa L Rev 1695 (2007). 
25Cicchetti and Wilde, supra note, at 1122 (noting Weisbrod’s analogy of such amenities to public goods, 
in that “individuals who may never purchase the commodity still hold a value for the option to do so”). The 
independent use of option value is, however, challenged in various places. See, e.g., A. Myrick Freeman 
III, The Measurement of Environmental and Resource Values 249–51 (Washington D.C.: Resources for the 6 
ensures its permanent loss. Many people would be willing to pay a significant amount to 
preserve their option to visit that area. Under federal law, option value must also be 
considered in the assessment of natural resource damages.
26 Many regulations pay 
attention to option value in the environmental context.
27 For numerous goods, people are 
willing to pay and to do a great deal in order to ensure that their options are preserved. 
Here, then, is a simple sense in which irreversible harm causes a loss that should 
be considered and that must be included in measures of value. Some skeptics contend that 
it “is hard to imagine a price for an irreversible loss,”
28 but people certainly do identify 
prices for such losses, or at least for the risk of such losses.
29 Whether or not we turn that 
value into some sort of monetary equivalent, or deem willingness to pay to be 
determinative, it ought to matter. 
The idea of option value, as used in the monetary valuation literature just 
discussed, is closely related to the use of the notion of “options” in the domain that I shall 
be emphasizing here. The simple claim is that when regulators are dealing with an 
irreversible loss, and when they are uncertain about the timing, magnitude, and likelihood 
of that loss, they should be willing to pay a sum—the option value—in order to maintain 
flexibility for the future. The option might not be exercised if it turns out that the loss is 
not a serious one. But if the option is purchased, regulators will be in a position to 
forestall that loss if it turns out to be large. The concern about irreversibility, and hence 
an Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle, are based on the idea that regulators should 
be willing to buy an option to maintain their own flexibility. (I am using terms that 
suggest monetary payments, but the basic point holds even if we are skeptical about the 
use of monetary equivalents; “purchases” can take the form of precautionary steps that do 
not directly involve money.) 
                                                                                                                                                 
Future, 2003) (suggesting that “what has been called an option value is really just the algebraic difference 
between the expected values of two different points on a WTP [willingness to pay] locus”). 
26See Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
27See, e.g., 60 Fed. Reg. 29914 (1995); 60 Fed.Reg. 28210. 29,914, 29,928 (1995); 59 Fed. Reg. 1062, 
1078 (1994). But see 69 Fed. Reg. 68,444 (2004) (doubting whether option value should be recognized as 
separate from others values). 
28See Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value 
of Nothing 185 (New York: New Press, 2004). 
29For a helpful overview, see Richard C. Bishop, Option Value: An Exposition and Extension, 58 Land 
Economics 1 (1982).  7 
In the domain of finance, options take multiple forms.
30 An investor might be 
willing to purchase land that is known to have deposits of gold. Even if the cost of 
extraction is too high to justify mining, ownership of the land creates an option to mine if 
the cost falls.
31 A standard “call option” is a right to purchase an asset prior to a specific 
date at a specified price.
32 (People might pay for the right to buy a share of stock in their 
favorite company at $50, six months from now.) In another variation, people might seek 
the right to abandon a project at a fixed price, perhaps on the occurrence of a specified 
worst-case scenario. (People might agree to perform some service for someone, but 
obtain the right not to perform in the event of bad weather, bad health, or some other 
contingency.) Alternatively, people might obtain the right to scale back a project, to 
expand it, or to extend its life. In another variation, people might seek the right to 
abandon a project at a fixed price, perhaps on the occurrence of a specified set of events. 
Alternatively, they might obtain the right to scale back a project, to expand it, or to 
extend its life. Options that recognize multiple sources of uncertainty, of the sort that can 
be found for many environmental problems, are termed “rainbow options.”
33  
Option theory has countless applications outside of the domain of investments. 
People would be willing to do and possibly even to spend a great deal to preserve their 
option to have another child—even if they are not at all sure that they really want to have 
another child. Or consider narrow judicial rulings, of the sort celebrated by judicial 
minimalists,
34 who want courts to make decisions that are focused on particular details 
and that leave many questions undecided. Narrow rulings can be understood as a way of 
“buying” an option, or at least of “paying” a certain amount by imposing decisionmaking 
burdens on others, in return for future flexibility. Judges who leave things undecided, and 
who focus their rulings on the facts of particular cases, are in a sense forcing themselves, 
and society as a whole, to purchase an option to pay for flexibility in the resolution of 
subsequent problems. Whether that option is worthwhile depends on its price and the 
benefits that it provides. Or consider the case of marriage and suppose that because of 
law or social norms, it is difficult to divorce, so that a decision to marry cannot readily be 
                                                 
30See Tom Copeland and Vladimir Antikarocov, Real Option 8-13 (2001). 
31See Richard Brealey and Stewart Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance565 (2002) 
32Id. at 582. 
33Copeland and Antikarocov, supra, at 13. 
34See generally Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). 8 
reversed. If so, prospective spouses might be willing to do a great deal to maintain their 
flexibility before marrying—far more than they would be willing to do if divorce were 
much easier.  
It should be readily apparent how an understanding of option value might explain 
the emphasis, in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and other environmental 
statutes, on irreversible losses. The central point of NEPA is to ensure that government 
officials give serious consideration to environmental factors before they take action that 
might threaten the environment.
35 If the government is building a road through a pristine 
area, drilling in Alaska, or licensing a nuclear power plant, it must produce an 
“environmental impact statement” discussing the environmental effects. The production 
of these statements can be burdensome and costly. But when potentially irreversible 
losses are involved, and when officials cannot specify the magnitude or likelihood of 
such losses, the public, and those involved in making the ultimate decision, ought to 
know about them.  
 
B.  Options, Imperfect Knowledge, and Precautions 
 
It should now be clear that the idea of option value might help support an 
Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle. The most influential essay was written by 
Kenneth Arrow and Anthony Fisher, who demonstrate that the ideas of uncertainty and 
irreversibility have considerable importance to the theory of environmental protection.
36 
Arrow and Fisher imagine that the question is whether to preserve a virgin redwood 
forest for wilderness recreation or instead to open it to clear-cut logging. Assume that if 
the development option is chosen, the destruction of the forest is effectively irreversible. 
Arrow and Fisher argue that it matters whether the authorities cannot yet assess the costs 
or benefits of a proposed development. If development produces “some irreversible 
transformation of the environment, hence a loss in perpetuity of the benefits from 
preservation,” then it is worth paying something to wait to acquire the missing 
information. Their suggestion is that “the expected benefits of an irreversible decision 
                                                 
35Bradley Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government's Environmental 
Performance, 102 Columbia Law Review 903 (2002). 
36See Kenneth Arrow and Anthony Fischer, Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty and Irreversibility, 88 
Q. J. Economics 312, 313-14 (1974). 9 
should be adjusted to reflect the loss of options it entails.”
37 
Fisher has generalized this argument to suggest that “[w]here a decision problem 
is characterized by (1) uncertainty about future costs and benefits of the alternatives, (2) 
prospects for resolving or reducing the uncertainty with the passage of time, and (3) 
irreversibility of one or more of the alternatives, an extra value, an option value, properly 
attaches to the reversible alternative(s).”
38 The intuition here is both straightforward and 
appealing: more steps should be taken to prevent harms that are effectively final than to 
prevent those that can be reversed at some cost. If an irreversible harm is on one side and 
a reversible one on the other, and if decisionmakers are uncertain
39 about future costs and 
benefits of precautions, an understanding of option value suggests that it is worthwhile to 
spend a certain amount to preserve future flexibility, by paying a premium to avoid the 
irreversible harm.  
Judge Richard Posner has invoked a point of this sort as a justification for 
aggressive steps to combat climate change.
40 Posner acknowledges that the size of the 
threat of climate change is disputed, and hence it is tempting to wait to regulate, or to 
wait to regulate aggressively, until we have more information. But there is a serious 
problem with waiting, which is “the practically irreversible effect of greenhouse-gas 
emissions on the atmospheric concentration of those gases.”
41 Thus Posner reasons that 
“[m]aking shallower cuts now can be thought of as purchasing an option to enable global 
warming to be stopped or slowed at some future time at a lower cost.”
42 The reduction in 
cost, as a result of current steps, could result from lowering current emissions or simply 
from increasing the rate of technological innovations that make pollution reduction less 
costly in the future. Posner concludes that the option approach makes sense for other 
                                                 
37Id. at 319. 
38See Anthony C. Fisher, Uncertainty, Irreversibility, and the Timing of Climate Policy 9 (2001), available 
at http://are.berkeley.edu/courses/IAS175/Spring2006/pdfs/Fisher.pdf. 
39 I use the word “uncertain” to refer to both risk and uncertainty. “Risk” exists when it is possible to assign 
probabilities to various outcomes; “uncertainty” exists when no probabilities can be assigned. For the 
seminal discussion, which has prompted a heated debate, see Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit 
(1933). For a nontechnical overview, see Jon Elster, Explaining Technical Change 185-207 (1983). 
40See Richard A. Posner, Catastrophe 161–62 (2004). A more technical discussion to the same effect is 
contained in Graciela Chichilnisky and Geoffrey Heal, Global Environmental Risks, 7 J. Econ. Persp. 65, 
76 (1993), emphasizing the need for a distinctive approach to “risks that are poorly understood, 
endogenous, collective, and irreversible.” Id. at 67. For a more detailed treatment of option value and 
irreversibility, see id. at 76-84. 
41Posner, supra note, at 161-62. 
42Id. at 162. 10 
catastrophic risks as well, including those associated with genetically modified crops. 
The general point here is that, as in the stock market, those involved in 
environmental protection are trying to project a stream of good and bad effects over time; 
the ability to project the stream of effects will improve and hence much can be gained 
from being able to make the decision later in time rather than earlier. If better decisions 
can be made in the future, then there is a value to putting the decision off to a later date. 
The key point is that uncertainty and irreversibility should lead to a sequential decision-
making process. If better information will emerge, regulators might seek an approach that 
preserves greater flexibility, at least if that approach is not too costly. The extent of the 
appropriate “irreversibility premium” depends on the details. 
 
III.  Seriousness and Sunk Costs 
 
Even under this account, the idea of irreversibility remains highly ambiguous. Let 
us consider two possible interpretations. Under the first, an effect is irreversible when 
restoration to the status quo is impossible or at best extremely difficult, at least on a 
relevant timescale. For example, the “decision not to preserve a rich reservoir of 
biodiversity such as the 60 million-year-old Korup forest in Nigeria is irreversible. The 
alteration or destruction of a unique asset of this type has an awesome finality.”
43 If this 
is the appropriate interpretation of irreversibility, then it is an aspect of seriousness. A 
second interpretation, standard in the economic literature on options, sees irreversibility 
in terms of sunk costs. The two interpretations lead to different understandings of the 
problem of irreversibility and the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle. 
 
A.  Irreversibility and Seriousness 
 
Under the first interpretation, the initial question is whether a clear line separates 
the reversible from the irreversible.
44 Perhaps we have a continuum, not a dichotomy. 
The question is not whether some effect can be reversed, but instead at what cost. Areas 
                                                 
43See Graciela Chichilnisky and Geoffrey Heal, Global Environmental Risks, 7 J. Econ. Persp. 65, 76 
(1993). 
44For a useful treatment, see Neil A. Manson, The Concept of Irreversibility: Its Use in the Sustainable 
Development and Precautionary Principle Literatures, 1 Electronic Journal of Sustainable Development 1 
(2007). 11 
that have been developed, or otherwise harmed, can often be returned to their original 
state, even if at considerable expense. Even lost forests can be restored. But sometimes 
the cost is high, even prohibitive, and sometimes restoration is literally impossible. 
Consider in this regard the mortality effects of certain environmental hazards. If air 
pollution would kill 200 people a year, or if climate change would produce tens of 
thousands of death in India, those losses cannot be recovered. Even biological changes in 
the human body may not be reversible (whether or not they are associated with 
immediate or long-term harm). Some kinds of air pollution induce changes that endure 
for decades. In all of these cases, irreversibility is simply an aspect of seriousness. If 200 
people will die from certain levels of pollution, the harm is more serious than if 200 
people would merely get sick. If air pollution induces biological changes, everything 
depends on the magnitude of the harm associated with those changes. 
At first glance, these points underline the mundane point that permanent or long-
term harms are more serious than short-term harms, under a framework suggestion that 
the extent of appropriate precautions depends on the size of the harms and the cost and 
burden associated with preventing or (if possible) reversing them. If climate change 
cannot be reversed at all, we should take more aggressive precautions than we would if it 
can be reversed only at great expense, monetary or otherwise—and if it can be reversed 
only at great expense, we would take more precautions than we would if it would be easy 
to reverse it.  
But there is a larger conceptual point here, which is that whether a particular act is 
“irreversible” depends on how it is characterized. Any death, of any living creature, is 
irreversible, and what is true for living creatures is true for rocks and refrigerators too; if 
these are destroyed, they are destroyed forever. And because time is linear, every 
decision is, in an intelligible sense, irreversible. If a couple goes on vacation in Greece in 
July of a certain year, that decision cannot be reversed, and what else might have been 
done at that time will have been permanently lost. Even if divorce is easy, a marriage is 
irreversible in the sense that people will have been married for the relevant period. If 
government builds a new highway in upstate New York in May, that particular decision 
will be irreversible; nothing else will be done with that land in May, even though the 
highway can be later replaced or eliminated. This is the sense in which “irreversibility” 12 
depends on how the underlying act is characterized. If we characterize it narrowly, to be 
and to do precisely what it is and does, any act is irreversible by definition. 
Environmentalists who are concerned about irreversibility have something far 
more particular in mind. They mean something like a large-scale alteration in 
environmental conditions—one that imposes permanent, or nearly permanent, changes in 
those conditions. It should be clear that irreversibility in this sense is not a sufficient 
reason for a highly precautionary approach. At a minimum, the irreversible change has to 
be for the worse, and it must also rise to a certain level of magnitude. A truly miniscule 
change in the global temperature, even if permanent, would not justify expensive 
precautions if it is benign or if it imposes little in the way of harm. For this reason, it is 
tempting to understand the idea of irreversibility, for environmental purposes, as 
inseparable from that of seriousness. A loss of a wisdom tooth is irreversible, but not a 
reason for particular precautions on behalf of wisdom teeth; a loss of an extremely small 
forest, with no wildlife, hardly justifies a special principle, even if that loss cannot be 
reversed. A loss of a large forest, with ample wildlife, is a very different matter. 
At first glance, then, irreversibility matters only because of its connection with the 
magnitude of the harm; irreversibility operates as a kind of amplifier. In law, a 
comparison might be made with the idea that courts will refuse to issue a preliminary 
injunction unless the plaintiff can show that there is a likelihood of an “irreparable harm” 
if the injunction is not granted.
45 Irreparability is not a sufficient condition for granting 
the injunction; the harm must be serious as well as irreparable. And if irreversibility in 
environmental protection is to be analyzed in the same way, then an Irreversible Harm 
Precautionary Principle is really part of a Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle,
46 or 
at least a Significant Harm Precautionary Principle.  
If so, the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle is important and must be 
taken into account; but it is not especially distinctive. The principle is also vulnerable, 
some of the time, to the same objections that apply to the Precautionary Principle as a 
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whole.
47 As we shall shortly see, significant and even irreversible harms may well be on 
all sides of risk-related problems, and a focus on one set of risks will give rise to others—
perhaps environmental risks as well.  
 
B.  Lost Amenities, Sunk Costs, and Imperfect Knowledge 
 
Analysts of irreversibility and options understand the idea of irreversibility in a 
different and technical way.
48 Irreversible investments are sunk costs—those that cannot 
be recovered. Examples include expenditures on advertising and marketing, or even 
capital investments designed to improve the performance of a factory. In fact the 
purchase of motor vehicles, computers, and office equipment is not fully reversible, 
because the purchase cost is usually significantly higher than resale value. Examples of 
reversible investments include the opening of bank accounts and the purchase of bonds. 
The problem with an investment that is irreversible is that those who make it relinquish 
“the possibility of waiting for new information that might affect the desirability or timing 
of the expenditure, and this lost option value is an opportunity cost that must be included 
as part of the investment.”
49 This, in short, is the economic conception of irreversibility 
that I mean to emphasize here. 
Many people agree that we should characterize, as irreversible harms, 
environmental effects that are both serious and extremely expensive and time-consuming 
to reverse. This is the understanding that leads Posnher and others to argue for the 
purchase of an “option” to slow down climate change at a lower rate in the future. 
Immediate adoption of a policy produces a “sunk benefit.” The argument is correct and 
important, but it neglects an important point: Irreversibility, in the relevant sense, might 
well lie on all sides. Regulation that reduces one (irreversible) environmental risk might 
well increase another such risk. Efforts to reduce climate change and other dangers 
associated with fossil fuel use, for example, may lead to increased dependence on nuclear 
energy, which threatens to produce irreversible harms of its own; in China, nuclear 
                                                 
47 See Sunstein, supra note. 
48See Avinash Dixit and Robert Pindyck, Investment under Uncertainty 6 (1994) (“When a firm makes an 
irreversible investment expenditure, it exercises, or “kills,” its option to invest. It gives up the possibility of 
waiting for new information to arrive that might affect the desirability or timing of the expenditure, and this 
lost option value is an opportunity cost that must be included as part of the investment.”). 
49Id. at 6. 14 
energy has been actively defended as a way of combating climate change.
50 As with the 
Precautionary Principle in general, so with the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle 
in particular: Measures that the principle requires, on grounds on safety and health, might 
well be prohibited on exactly those grounds.
51 And there is a more general point. If steps 
are taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, capital costs will be incurred, and they 
cannot be recouped. Sunk costs are a familiar feature of environmental regulation, in the 
form of mandates that require technological change. We are often dealing, then, with 
irreversibilities, not irreversibility. 
For many environmental problems, this point complicates the application of the 
Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle. As Fisher writes for climate change, in the 
abstract “it is not clear whether the conditions of the problem imply that investment in 
control ought to be slowed or reduced, while waiting for information needed to make a 
better decision, or that investment should come sooner to preserve the option to protect 
ourselves from impacts that may be revealed in the future as serious or even 
catastrophic.”
52 It is for this reason that some observers have concluded, unlike Judge 
Posner, that the existence of uncertainty and irreversibility argue for less, not more, in a 
way of investments in reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
53 Those investments may 
themselves turn out to be irreversible. Everything depends on the likelihood and 
magnitude of the losses on all sides. 
Judge Posner’s analysis does not use the idea of options in the technical sense. He 
emphasizes the cumulative effect of emissions on atmospheric concentrations of carbon 
dioxide.
54 Because of that cumulative effect, a steady or even declining rate of emissions 
will still cause concentrations to increase. He notes, correctly, that it may be much harder 
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and more expensive to slow climate change in the future than in the present
55—a point 
that comes close to the technical understanding of irreversibility in the economic 
literature. But a full analysis of irreversibility must also attend to the irreversible losses 
associated with greenhouse gas reductions.  
Nothing said here supports the increasingly implausible view that the right 
approach to climate change is adequately captured in the area of “wait and learn.” That 
approach makes sense only if we lose very little when we defer investments while 
waiting to obtain more information about the benefits. But if a great deal is likely to be 
lost by deferring such investments, then the judgment should be reversed; and there is 
good reason to believe that the irreversible losses associated with climate change do 
indeed justify the irreversible losses associated with greater investments in emissions 
reductions, world-wide.
56 My conclusion is that if irreversibility is defined in economic 
terms, pointing to the value of preserving flexibility for an uncertain future, it provides a 
distinctive and plausible understanding of the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle. 
As we will see, this understanding also helps explains some of the most important 
functions of NEPA. 
 
IV. Irreversibility and Incommensurability 
 
The first conception of irreversibility misses something important. When people 
say that the loss of a pristine area, or of a species, is irreversible, they do not merely mean 
that the loss is grave and that it takes a great dal to provide adequate compensation. They 
mean that what is lost is incommensurable—that it is qualitatively distinctive, and that 
when we lose it, we lose something that is unique.
57 
The central claims here are that human goods are diverse and that we do violence 
to our considered judgments about them when we line them up along a single metric.
58 
Suppose, for example, that a species of tigers or elephants is lost. The nature of the 
concern about lost species is not adequately captured in the idea of “option value.” The 
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species is not its economic equivalent. People do not value an endangered species in the 
same way that they value money; it is not as if a species, a beach, a friendship, or a child 
is indistinguishable from specified monetary sums. If we see species, beaches, 
friendships, and children as equivalent to one another, or as equal to some amount of 
money, we will have on odd and even unrecognizable understanding of all of these 
goods. When people object to the loss of a species or a beach, and contend that the loss is 
irreversible, they mean to point to its permanence, and to the fact that what has been lost 
is not valued in the same way or along the same metric as money. Return to the issue of 
climate change and note that on some estimates, a significant percentage of the world’s 
species will be lost as a result of warmer temperatures.
59 On one view, what makes this 
loss “irreversible” is that something qualitatively unique, without real substitutes, will be 
gone permanently. 
This claim—a challenge to prominent understandings of utilitarian conceptions of 
value
60—should not be confused. Of course people are willing to make trade-offs among 
qualitatively diverse goods, and they do so all the time. We will pay a certain amount, 
and no more, to be able to protect members or an endangered species or to visit the 
beach, or to help preserve it in a pristine state; we will not pay an infinite sum to see our 
friends, or even to maintain our friendships; we will take some precautions, but not 
others, to protect our children. To say that a good is not fungible is not to say that it is 
infinitely valuable. To say that a good lacks substitutes is not to deny that people will 
give up some amount, and not more, to preserve it. The emphasis on incommensurability 
is not meant to deny that tradeoffs are made. The point is only that when a loss is deemed 
irreversible, it is because it is not believed to be fungible with other human goods. Many 
of those who are concerned about irreversible harms intend to stress this point. What is 
gained by an understanding of incommensurability is a more vivid appreciation of why 
certain losses cannot be dismissed as mere “costs.”  
These points are closely connected with important claims in environmental 
ethics.
61 On one view, “not everything is substitutable for everything else through the 
medium of utility. And a corollary of that fact is the further fact that some things are 
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irreplaceable.”
62 A wild and scenic river, for example, might be valued because of its 
origins and history; a restoration of that river, as for example through an artificial 
watercourse, would not provide an adequate substitute.
63 Foundations for this view might 
be found in a claim that natural processes have some kind of intrinsic value, simply 
because they are natural.
64 If that idea seems implausible or contentious, at least we might 
be able to agree that certain decisions would produce losses that are in a moral sense 
irreversible even if that claim seems mysterious from the standpoint of economic theory.  
It follows that an Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle, used in private 
decisions or democratic arenas, might be implemented with a recognition of the 
qualitative distinctness of many environmental losses—especially when those losses 
affect future generations. Here too, however, it is important to see that precautionary 
steps may themselves impose incommensurable losses, not merely monetary ones. 
Recall, for example, that environmental protection of one sort may create environmental 
problems of another sort. If the diverse nature of social goods is to play a part in the 
implementations of an Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle, it must attend to the 
fact that diverse goods may be on all sides. And here too there is no escaping at least 
implicit assignment of monetary values to those goods. To say that an environmental loss 
is not commensurate with money, in a moral sense, is not to say that human beings can 
avoid some form of monetization. The point is that in the domains of private choice and 
democratic judgment, any monetary assignment should be undertaken with an 
understanding of the nature of the goods at stake. Of course this point does not provide 
any lesson for how the important issue of how the assignment of monetary value should 
occur. But for those concerned about irreversibility in the relevant sense, that is not the 
only issue. 
 
V.  Environmental Injunctions 
 
An understanding of these points helps to explain some longstanding disputes 
about the issuance of preliminary injunctions in environmental cases. For many years, 
some courts of appeals had held that when environmental harm was alleged, district 
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courts should adopt a presumption of irreparable damage and indeed a presumption in 
favor of injunctive relief.
65 On a widespread view, environmental harms are presumed to 
be irreparable and to provide an appropriate occasion for such relief.
66 In NEPA cases, 
the result was a likely injunction if the agency had failed to prepare an adequate 
environmental impact statement: “Irreparable damage is presumed when an agency fails 
to evaluate thoroughly the environmental impact of a proposed action.”
67 Apparently the 
idea is that if no environmental impact statement is provided, or if any such statement is 
inadequate, the risk to the environment is presumed to be irreparable, perhaps in the sense 
of irreversible. But what is the basis for this presumption? And what follows from it? 
Does it follow that injunctions will issue in any case in which a private or public 
institution has failed to comply, even as a technical matter, with federal environmental 
law? Does it follow, for example, that the United States Navy must be enjoined from 
conducting weapons-training operations before it has obtained a permit to discharge 
ordnance into the sea?  
In response to the last question, the Supreme Court offered a negative answer.
68 
Rejecting the idea that environmental violations should give rise to automatic injunctions, 
the Court said that an injunction is an equitable remedy, subject to traditional balancing, 
and that it would “not lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart from 
established principles” permitting district courts to exercise their discretion.
69 In a 
subsequent case, involving the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, the Court 
underlined the point and expressly rejected the presumption of irreparable harm in 
environmental cases.
70 “This presumption is contrary to traditional equitable 
principles.”
71 Nonetheless, the Court stressed environmental problems raise distinct 
issues, because “[e]nvironmental injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately 
remedied by money damages and is often permanent or at least of long duration, i.e., 
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irreparable.”
72 Notably, the Court did not explain what it meant by the intriguing claim 
that environmental injuries “can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages.” 
But the Court said that if an environmental injury is likely, “the balance of harms will 
usually favor the issuance of an injunction to protect the environment.” 
73 
When courts of appeals spoke in terms of a presumption in favor of injunctive 
relief, they might be understood as adopting a version of the Irreversible Harm 
Precautionary Principle—assuming that environmental harm is irreversible in the relevant 
sense, and requiring a strong showing by those who seek to proceed in the face of that 
harm. This interpretation helps to explain the simplest exception to the lower courts’ 
presumption: cases in which “irreparable harm to the environment would result if such 
relief were granted.”
74 If, for example, an injunction against the use of a logging road 
would prevent the removal of diseased trees and hence allow the spread of infect 
infection through national forests, no injunction would issue.
75  
Here, then, is a clear recognition of the existence of environment-environment 
tradeoffs, in a way that requires a qualification of any Irreversible Harm Precautionary 
Principle. And when the Supreme Court rejected the presumption, it did so in favor of 
traditional equitable balancing, in a way that recognized that serious harms, and perhaps 
irreversible harms, are on all sides. But even in doing so, the Court endorsed a kin of 
Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle through its (too-simple) suggestion that 
environmental injury “is often permanent or at least of long duration” and its statement 
that harms to the environment can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages. 
Indeed, the latter statement seems to be an implicit recognition of the incommensurability 
problem.  
What remains undecided, after the Court’s decisions in the 1980s, is the 
appropriate judicial posture in the face of violations of NEPA.
76 The Court’s rejection of 
a presumption in favor of preliminary injunctions might well be taken to suggest that 
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such injunctions ought rarely to issue in NEPA cases
77—especially, perhaps, in light of 
the fact that NEPA is a purely procedural statute, one that imposes information-gathering 
duties on agencies without requiring them to take that information into account.
78 If 
courts cannot forbid agencies to act as they choose after producing an adequate 
environmental impact statement, injunctions might seem an odd remedy in the NEPA 
setting. But in what remains the most elaborate discussion of the question, then-Circuit 
Judge Breyer suggested that injunctions are often appropriate in NEPA cases.
79 The 
discussion endorses an appropriately constrained Irreversible Harm Precautionary 
Principle, adapted to the NEPA setting, and resting on some combination of the accounts 
of irreversibility offered here.
80 
Judge Breyer did not contend that a presumption in favor of injunctive relief 
would be appropriate for environmental cases in general. Instead he argued that NEPA is 
meant to prevent a particular kind of injury, one that should play a central role in the 
decision whether to grant an injunction. The purpose of NEPA is to ensure that officials 
take environmental considerations into account before they embark on a course of action. 
“Thus, when a decision to which NEPA obligations attach is made without the informed 
environmental consideration that NEPA requires, the harm that NEPA intends to prevent 
has been suffered.”
81 That harm is not adequately described as a harm to the environment 
as such.
82 The harm is instead the increased risk of harm to the environment that arises 
“when governmental decisionmakers make up their minds without having before them an 
analysis (with prior public comment) of the likely effects of their decision upon the 
environment.”
83  
Irreversibility is central here, for it is simply the case that administrators are less 
likely to destroy a nearly completed project than one that has only started. The relevant 
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harm “may well have to do with the psychology of decisionmakers, and perhaps a more 
deeply rooted psychological instinct not to tear down projects once they are built.”
84 The 
problem is that “real environmental harm will occur through inadequate foresight and 
deliberation.”
85 Judge Breyer’s point, then, is that “the district court should take account 
of the potentially irreparable nature of this decisionmaking risk to the environment when 
considering a request for preliminary injunction.”
86  
We can understand this analysis in one of two ways, corresponding to the two 
conceptions of irreversible environmental harm. The first involves the distinctive value of 
(some) environmental amenities and the risk that once they are lost, they are lost forever. 
The context in which Judge Breyer wrote, involving a pristine area, helps to clarify what 
may be at stake. The second involves imperfect information and option value. One goal 
of NEPA is to acquire environmental information at an early stage, in order to ensure that 
officials do not compromise future flexibility by embarking on courses of action that 
acquire unstoppable momentum. Injunctions, in the face of NEPA violations, freeze the 
status quo in a way that promotes that flexibility. 
None of this means that in NEPA cases, preliminary injunctions should issue as a 
matter of course; that view would endorse the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle 
in its crudest form. Sometimes injunctions will themselves impose serious harm, and 
sometimes the risk to the environment is trivial.
87 But in NEPA cases, it makes sense to 
consider, as a relevant factor, the risk that an inadequately informed decision to proceed 
will alter the status quo, ensuring that once an environmental impact statement is 
produced, it will be too late to have a meaningful effect on the outcome. If delay is not 
exceedingly costly, and if the risk of environmental harm is serious, injunctive relief is 
appropriate for NEPA violations. An understanding of the risk of irreversibility helps to 
explain why. 
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VI. Qualifications and Conclusions 
 
The basis for an Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle, along with an 
understanding of its limitations, are now in place. We lack any kind of algorithm for 
implementing that principle. But we should be able to that when a harm is irreversible in 
the sense that it is very costly or impossible to make restoration, special precautions may 
be justified; that it often makes sense to “buy” an option to preserve future flexibility; and 
that the loss of cherished and qualitatively distinctive goods deserves particular attention.  
But there are three important qualifications, involving the idea of optimal delay, 
distributional considerations, and what I shall call precommitment value. Let us briefly 
explore each of these. 
 
A. Irreversibilities and Optimal Delay 
 
The general notion of optimal delay provides important countervailing 
considerations. Future generations will almost certainly be both wealthier and more 
knowledgeable than the current generation. For this reason, they will be in a far better 
position, and possibly an unimaginably better position, to handle environmental problems 
that materialize in their time.
88 According to the Thomas Schelling, the nearly inevitable 
increase in wealth over time means that it “makes no sense to make current generations 
‘pay’ for the problems of future generations.”
89 Why should the relatively poor present 
transfer its limited resources to benefit the future, which is likely to be relatively rich? 
There is another problem. Expensive investments in precautions—such as greenhouse gas 
reduction—may turn out to diminish available resources for future generations, leaving 
them with less to use to control the damage that actually occurs.
90  
The argument for “wait and learn” is strengthened by these points. But any such 
argument must also take account of the incontrovertible fact that waiting simultaneously 
threatens to diminish the flexibility of future decisionmakers, and perhaps severely.
91 
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Compare the loss of endangered species; because the loss is permanent, we have to be 
careful about delaying precautionary measures designed to ensure their continued 
existence. 
 
B. Irreversibilities, Distribution, and the Least Well-off 
 
At first glance, an Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle might seem to be 
especially beneficial to disadvantaged people.
92 In the context of climate change, 
aggressive precautions are projected to give far more to poor countries than to rich ones, 
partly because rich nations are so much less dependent on agriculture.
93 Nonetheless, 
there is no simple connection between distributional goals and an emphasis on 
irreversible harms. Some of the risks associated with genetic engineering are irreversible, 
but the benefits of genetic engineering are likely to be felt most in poor nations. In the 
context of climate change, poor countries, including India and China, cannot easily afford 
aggressive regulation; they might be better off if they are allowed to continue to emit 
greenhouse gases.  
In short, the analysis of distributional goals must be undertaken separately from 
the analysis of irreversibility. Sometimes we will hurt the least well-off, rather than help 
them, if we buy an option to preserve our own flexibility. The cost of the option might be 
paid mostly by those who can least afford it.  
 
C. Precommitment Value 
 
I have emphasized the value of preserving our flexibility. But in some domains, 
future flexibility is undesirable, and individual and societies are willing to pay a great 
deal to eliminate it. The tale of Ulysses and the Sirens is perhaps the most familiar 
example,
94 and the idea of precommitment has many applications. A Constitution can 
itself be seen as a precommitment device, by which we relinquish our flexibility in order 
to be governed by firm rules. With respect to terrorism, we might do best if we commit 
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ourselves to taking certain courses of action if we are attacked; the precommitment 
creates deterrence.  
In the environmental context, regulators might be willing to pay for 
precommitment strategies that will operate as a constraint on any number of problems, 
including interest-group power, myopia, weakness of will, cognitive biases. Indeed, the 
conventional Precautionary Principle, understood to place a thumb on the scales in favor 
of environmental protection, might be explained in these terms.
95 Perhaps the principle 
can be understood not as an effort to preserve flexibility, which can be bad, but on the 
contrary as an effort to ensure a commitment to a course of action that will protect the 
environment. 
The difficulty, for any such explanation, should now be familiar: any 
precommitment strategy may give rise to problems, including environmental problems, 
for which a precommitment strategy might also be justified. It is nonetheless important to 
see that option value is sometimes paralleled by “precommitment value,” for which 
regulators might be willing to spend a great deal.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The concept of irreversibility might be taken to refer to the sheer gravity of 
certain losses, and ideas about both permanence and magnitude play a large role in 
intuitions about environmental protection. I have suggested, however, that the concept is 
best understood in two distinctive ways. On the economic account, the concern about 
irreversibility refers to people’s willingness to pay a premium to maintain flexibility for 
the future. In many settings, it makes sense to pay for an option to avoid a risk of losses 
that are irreversible in the sense that they cannot be recouped. The amount of the payment 
depends on the size and nature of the loss if it is irreversible. If irreversible losses are on 
both sides, then it is necessary to assess their likelihood and their magnitude. We can find 
an implicit understanding of option value in the emphasis on irreversibility in NEPA and 
other federal statutes, along with many international agreements. But because 
environmental expenditures are typically sunk costs, an emphasis on irreversibility will 
                                                 
  95  See David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 97 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 1315 (2003). 25 
sometimes argue in favor of delaying, rather than accelerating, environmental protection. 
Whether it does so depends on what is known about the magnitude and likelihood of the 
relevant effects. It is necessary to assess both of these in order to know how to proceed. 
On an alternative view, the idea of irreversibility points to the qualitative 
distinctness of certain environmental goods, and the implausibility of suggesting that 
those goods are fungible with money. Of course such goods are not infinitely valuable. 
But it is obtuse to think that wildlife or pristine areas are valued in the same way as their 
cash equivalents. Anyone who believed in such equivalence would have an 
unrecognizable understanding of how wildlife and pristine areas are properly appreciated 
and experienced. This understanding of irreversibility is difficult to operationalize; it does 
not suggest any particular specification of an Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle. 
But it does, I suggest, help to illuminate important areas of federal law, including the 
courts’ relative willingness to issue injunctions in environmental cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Readers with comments should address them to: 
 
Professor Cass Sunstein 
University of Chicago Law School 
1111 East 60th Street 
Chicago, IL  60637 
 csunstei@uchicago.edu 26 
Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics 
(Second Series) 
 
For a listing of papers 1–299 please go to Working Papers at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html 
 
300.  Adam B. Cox, The Temporal Dimension of Voting Rights (July 2006) 
301.  Adam B. Cox, Designing Redistricting Institutions (July 2006) 
302.  Cass R. Sunstein, Montreal vs. Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols (August 2006) 
303.  Kenneth W. Dam, Legal Institutions, Legal Origins, and Governance (August 2006) 
304.  Anup Malani and Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities (September 2006) 
305.  Douglas Lichtman, Irreparable Benefits (September 2006) 
306.  M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation when Agency Costs 
Are Low (September 2006) 
307.  Michael Abramowicz and M. Todd Henderson, Prediction Markets for Corporate Governance 
(September 2006) 
308.  Randal C. Picker, Who Should Regulate Entry into IPTV and Municipal Wireless? (September 
2006) 
309.  Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive (September 2006) 
310.  David Gilo and Ariel Porat, The Unconventional Uses of Transaction Costs (October 2006) 
311.  Randal C. Picker, Review of Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution 
(October 2006) 
312.  Dennis W. Carlton and Randal C. Picker, Antitrust and Regulation (October 2006) 
313.  Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Liability Externalities and Mandatory Choices: Should Doctors 
Pay Less? (November 2006) 
314.  Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law (November 
2006) 
315.  Lior J. Strahilevitz, Wealth without Markets? (November 2006) 
316.  Ariel Porat, Offsetting Risks (November 2006) 
317.  Bernard E. Harcourt and Jens Ludwig, Reefer Madness: Broken Windows Policing and 
Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in New York City, 1989–2000 (December 2006) 
318.  Bernard E. Harcourt, Embracing Chance: Post-Modern Meditations on Punishment (December 
2006) 
319.  Cass R. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism (December 2006) 
320.  William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Presidential Pardons and 
Commutations (January 2007) 
321.  Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberating Groups versus Prediction Markets (or Hayek’s Challenge to 
Habermas) (January 2007) 
322.  Cass R. Sunstein, Completely Theorized Agreements in Constitutional Law (January 2007) 
323.  Albert H. Choi and Eric A. Posner, A Critique of the Odious Debt Doctrine (January 2007) 
324.  Wayne Hsiung and Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change and Animals (January 2007) 
325.  Cass. R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis without Analyzing Costs or Benefits: Reasonable 
Accommodation, Balancing and Stigmatic Harms (January 2007) 
326.  Cass R. Sunstein, Willingness to Pay versus Welfare (January 2007) 
327.  David A. Weisbach, The Irreducible Complexity of Firm-Level Income Taxes: Theory and 
Doctrine in the Corporate Tax (January 2007) 
328.  Randal C. Picker, Of Pirates and Puffy Shirts: A Comments on “The Piracy Paradox: Innovation 
and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design” (January 2007) 
329.  Eric A. Posner, Climate Change and International Human Rights Litigation: A Critical Appraisal 
(January 2007) 
330.  Randal C. Picker, Pulling a Rabbi Out of His Hat: The Bankruptcy Magic of Dick Posner 
(February 2007) 
331.  Bernard E. Harcourt, Judge Richard Posner on Civil Liberties: Pragmatic (Libertarian) 
Authoritarian (February 2007) 27 
332.  Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care? (February 
2007) 
333.  Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For (March 2007) 
334.  Eugene Kontorovich, Inefficient Customs in International Law (March 2007) 
335.  Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Asylum to the Prison: Rethinking the Incarceration Revolution. 
Part II: State Level Analysis (March 2007) 
336.  Cass R. Sunstein, Due Process Traditionalism (March 2007) 
337.  Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act (March 2007) 
338.  M. Todd Henderson, Deconstructing Duff & Phelps (March 2007) 
339.   Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, The Prime Directive (April 2007) 
340.  Cass R. Sunstein, Illusory Losses (May 2007) 
341.  Anup Malani, Valuing Laws as Local Amenities (June 2007) 
342.  David A. Weisbach, What Does Happiness Research Tell Us about Taxation? (June 2007) 
343.  David S. Abrams and Chris Rohlfs, Optimal Bail and the Value of Freedom: Evidence from the 
Philadelphia Bail Experiment (June 2007) 
344.  Christopher R. Berry and Jacob E. Gersen, The Fiscal Consequences of Electoral Institutions 
(June 2007) 
345.  Matthew Adler and Eric A. Posners, Happiness Research and Cost-Benefit Analysis (July 2007) 
346.  Daniel Kahneman and Cass R. Sunstein, Indignation: Psychology, Politics, Law (July 2007) 
347.  Jacob E. Gersen and Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions (July 2007) 
348.  Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns (July 2007) 
349.  Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Privacy versus Antidiscrimination (July 2007) 
350.  Bernard E. Harcourt, A Reader’s Companion to Against Prediction: A Reply to Ariela Gross, 
Yoram Margalioth, and Yoav Sapir on Economic Modeling, Selective Incapacitation, 
Governmentality, and Race (July 2007) 
351.  Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “Don’t Try This at Home”:  Posner as Political Economist (July 2007) 
352.  Cass R. Sunstein, The Complex Climate Change Incentives of China and the United States 
(August 2007) 
353.  David S. Abrams and Marianne Bertrand, Do Judges Vary in Their Treatment of Race? (August 
2007) 
354.  Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice (August 2007) 
355.  David A. Weisbach, A Welfarist Approach to Disabilities (August 2007) 
356.  David S. Abrams, More Time, Less Crime? Estimating the Deterrent Effect of Incarceration using 
Sentencing Enhancements (August 2007) 
357.  Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati and Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain 
Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary (August 2007) 
358.  Joseph Bankman and David A. Weisbach, Consumption Taxation Is Still Superior to Income 
Taxation (September 2007) 
359.  Douglas G. Baird and M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money (September 2007) 
360.  William Meadow and Cass R. Sunstein, Causation in Tort: General Populations vs. Individual 
Cases (September 2007) 
361.  Richard McAdams and Janice Nadler, Coordinating in the Shadow of the Law: Two 
Contextualized Tests of the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance (September 2007) 
362.  Richard McAdams, Reforming Entrapment Doctrine in United States v. Hollingsworth (September 
2007) 
363.  M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of Dissent (October 
2007) 
364.  Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation (October 2007) 
365.  David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity (October 2007) 
366.  Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0 (October 2007) 
367.  Jonathan R. Nash and Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Investigation into Appellate Structure and the 
Perceived Quality of Appellate Review (October 2007) 
368.  Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review (November 2007) 
369.  Anup Malani, Maciej F. Boni, Abraham Wickelgren, and Ramanan Laxminarayan, Controlling 
Avian Influenza in Chickens (November 2007) 
370.  Richard H. McAdams, The Economic Costs of Inequality (November 2007) 28 
371.  Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information 
(November 2007) 
372.  Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism (December 2007) 
373.  M. Todd Henderson, Everything Old Is New Again: Lessons from Dodge V. Ford Motor 
Company (December 2007) 
374.  Jonathan Remy Nash, Economic Efficiency versus Public Choice: The Case of Property Rights in 
Road Traffic (December 2007) 
375.  Edward L. Glaeser and Cass R. Sunstein, Extremism and Social Learning (December 2007) 
376.  Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Are Judges Overpaid?: A Skeptical Response 
to the Judicial Salary Debate (December 2007) 
377.  Eric A. Posner, Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter?: Implications of Judicial Bias Studies 
for Legal and Constitutional Reform (January 2008) 
378.  Susan Bandes, The Heart Has Its Reasons: Examining the Strange Persistence of the American 
Death Penalty (January 2008) 
379.  Susan Bandes, After Innocence: Framing Wrongful Convictions (January 2008) 
380.  Jacob E. Gersen and Ann Joseph O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law (January 2008) 
381.  Richard A. Epstein, The Property Rights Movement and Intellectual Property (January 2008) 
382.  Richard A. Epstein, Some Reflections on Custom in the IP Universe (January 2008) 
383.  Richard A. Epstein, Decentralized Responses to Good Fortune and Bad Luck (January 2008) 
384.  Richard A. Epstein, How to Create—or Destroy—Wealth in Real Property (January 2008) 
385.  Richard A. Epstein, The Human and Economic Dimensions of Altruism: The Case of Organ 
Transplantation (January 2008) 
386.  Cass R. Sunstein, Adolescent Risk-Taking and Social Meaning: A Commentary (January 2008) 
387.  Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Conspiracy Theories (January 2008) 
388.  Ariel Porat, Expanding Restitution: Liability for Unrequested Benefits (January 2008) 
389.  Randal C. Picker, Twombly, Leegin and the Reshaping of Antitrust (February 2008) 
390.  Alon Harrel and Ariel Porat, Aggregating Probabilities across Offences in Criminal Law (March 
2008) 
391.  John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur, Hedonic Adaptation and the 
Settlement of Civil Lawsuits (March 2008) 
392.  Randal C. Picker, Fair Use v. Fair Access (March 2008) 
393.  Jonathan S. Masur, Process as Purpose: Administrative Procedure, Costly Screens and 
Examination at the Patent Office (March 2008) 
394.  Eric A. Posner, Human Welfare, Not Human Rights (March 2008) 
395.   Lee Anne Fennell, Slices and Lumps, 2008 Coase Lecture (March 2008) 
396.   Eric A. Posner, Fault in Contract Law (March 2008) 
397.  Cass R. Sunstein, Is OSHA Unconstitutional? (March 2008) 
398.  Randal C. Picker, Take Two: Stare Decisis in Antitrust/The Per Se Rule against Horizontal Price-
Fixing (March 2008) 
399.  M. Todd Henderson and Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market for Altruism (April 
2008) 
400.  Shyam Balganesh,Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives (April 2008) 
401.  Cass R. Sunstein and Reid Hastie, Four Failures of Deliberating Groups (April 2008) 
402.  M. Todd Henderson, Justin Wolfers and Eric Zitzewitz, Predicting Crime (April 2008) 
403.  Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) 
Summeary Judgments (April 2008) 
404.  William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study (April 
2008) 
405.  Stephen J. Chooi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Which States Have the Best (and Worst) High 
Courts? (May 2008) 
406.  Richard H. McAdams and Janice Nadler, Coordinating in the Shadow of the Law: Two 
Contextualized Tests of the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance (May 2008) 
407.  Cass R. Sunstein, Two Conceptions of Irreversible Environmental Harm (Mary 2008) 
 